Abstract The nature and extent of dolphin intelligence has long intrigued humans. Unequivocal answers to the question "how intelligent are dolphins?" have proven evasive due to both the existing myriad views of intelligence and the ambiguity of much spontaneous dolphin behavior. In this paper, we focus on one aspect of intelligence, namely the ability to plan one's behavior in a meaningful way. The generalized ability to create novel and appropriate behavioral plans when confronted with new problems has obvious evolutionary advantages, but has been found in relatively few species. The studies reported in this paper demonstrate planning behaviors in bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops truncatus) in conditions quite different from those that occur during dolphin foraging and mating (two areas in which wild dolphins may engage in planning). The dolphins' ability to plan their behaviors in these novel contexts provides additional evidence that generalized planning ability is not unique to humans, and demonstrate that human-like language is not required for generalized planning skills. These findings also suggest that in addition to species niche specific cognitive abilities, generalized cognitive abilities may play an important role in the evolutionary success of some species.
How intelligent are dolphins?
We have noticed that when we are asked about the intelligence of dolphins most of the questioners already have an answer in mind. Some individuals believe that dolphins are simply animals, and so lack sophisticated cognitive skills. Others suggest that dolphins are intelligent for animals, but that there is nothing really special about their cognitive abilities, and certainly not in comparison to human cognition. And then there are those who suggest that dolphins are in fact very intelligent, perhaps even more intelligent than humans. An individual's belief in the nature and extent of dolphin intelligence depends on both her definition of intelligence and her interpretation of the cognitive significance of dolphin behavior. Intelligence has proven difficult to define, even for psychologists that study humans. The various definitions of intelligence have resulted in disputes about both the nature of human intelligence and the best ways to measure intelligence in humans (e.g., see Gardner, 1993; Sternberg, Published online in J-STAGE: June 12, 2009 doi: 10.2502 Lecture 動物心理学研究 第59巻第１号
- 100 -2004). Part of the problem is that intelligence is a concept that encompasses many related cognitive abilities, including abstract thinking, comprehension of information from a variety of perceptual modalities, problem solving, symbol use (including language comprehension and production), concept formation, and creativity. Given the difficulty of defining and measuring intelligence in our own species, the lack of consensus about the intelligence of other species, including dolphins, is not surprising. The wide range of opinions about dolphin intelligence also results in part from the public's fascination with dolphins, a fascination that is evidenced by attendance at marine parks that house dolphins, the increasing popularity of "swim with dolphins" programs, and the number of wild dolphin (and whale) watching excursions that are available world-wide. Given this, it is not surprising that the media sometimes reports sensational articles about dolphin intelligence  one tabloid article emphatically announced that dolphins had been repeatedly contacted by extra-terrestrials because dolphins were much more intelligent than humans (which we assume is also meant to imply that dolphins would be more interesting than humans to extra-terrestrials). Admittedly, this is an extreme case, but the fact remains that there are many descriptions of dolphins as an extraordinarily intelligent species in the popular media. Of course, contributions to the notion that dolphins are exceptionally intelligent beings are not solely the result of reporters, authors, and editors hoping to increase the sales of their newspapers, magazines and books. Researchers that have studied dolphin intelligence and communication have contributed to this notion as well. Perhaps the most infamous researcher of this ilk was John Lilly, who studied dolphin behavior and communication in the 1950s and 1960s (see Lilly, 1962 Lilly, , 1967 . One of Lilly's suggestions was that dolphins possess culture and that they transmit knowledge from one generation to the next via long folk tales and legends.
It is clear from this suggestion that Lilly equated dolphins with humans in at least two ways. First, he assumed that dolphins, like humans, have cultures. Although the notion of dolphin culture has support among contemporary scholars, Lilly's view of dolphin culture is quite different from the modern view of dolphin culture (see Rendell & Whitehead, 2001; Kuczaj & Highfill, 2005; Sargeant & Mann, 2009; Whitehead, 2009) . Second, Lilly's notion that dolphins pass along cultural knowledge "with long folk tales and legends" is fanciful at best. There is no evidence that dolphins have folk tales or legends, nor is there any evidence that dolphins communicate information of this sort to one another. When one of us points this out in talks, there is often one member of the audience who correctly mentions that the absence of proof is not the same as the proof of absence. In other words, the fact that we have not discovered a single dolphin folk tale or legend does not mean that they do not exist. This is true, but the fact remains that not one of a large number of diligent and conscientious researchers concerned with dolphin communication and dolphin culture has reported anything resembling a dolphin "folk tale" (Pryor & Norris, 1991; Mann et al, 2000; Dudzinski & Frohoff, 2008) , and so it seems safest to assume that Lilly's assumptions in this regard are without basis.
Do big brains mean more intelligence?
Dolphins possess relatively large brains, particularly in regard to their body size. In fact, the size of the dolphin brain is one of the reasons that John Lilly (1962 Lilly ( , 1967 supposed that dolphins were capable of remarkable mental feats. Although few contemporary scholars believe Lilly's claims regarding the nature of dolphin culture and dolphin linguistic ability, the notion that the dolphin brain provides sufficient hardware for some sorts of sophisticated cognitive abilities is a recurring theme in the scientific literature on dolphin cognition (Marino et al., 2008) .
In order to reduce possible confounds between body size and brain size, the Encephalization Quotient (EQ) is sometimes used to compare brain sizes across species. An EQ is calculated by comparing an animal's body weight with its brain weight (Marino, 2002) . For comparisons sake, the EQ for humans is 7:1, which means that the average human brain is seven times larger than the average brain for species with bodies that weigh about the same as an average human's body. Many primates also have relatively high EQs, but dolphin EQs are typically higher than those of great apes but lower than those of humans. Not all authors agree that larger brains (or larger EQs) result in more intelligent animals. Manger (2006) argued that dolphins are not particularly intelligent, and that their large brains evolved to help them regulate body temperature rather than as the result of some evolutionary advantage that additional cognitive abilities would provide. This view has met with considerable criticism, and neither the claim that the dolphin brain evolved primarily as an internal furnace nor the claim that dolphins are relatively cognitively unsophisticated has support in the scientific literature (see Marino et al., 2008 , for an excellent critique of Manger's claims). Rather than providing another review of the literature on dolphin cognition, in the remainder of this paper we will focus on one aspect of dolphin behavior that we believe has particular significance for our understanding of dolphin intelligence  their ability to plan their behavior. But we refer readers interested in other aspects of dolphin cognition to the following: Herman (1980; ; Schusterman, Thomas & Wood (1986) : Roitblat, Herman & Nachtigall (1993) ; Kuczaj & Walker (2006) , Kuczaj & Yeater (2006) , Morisaka (2007) , White (2007) , and Marino et al. (2008) .
The significance of the ability to plan Many animal species have evolved specific cognitive abilities that enable them to better exploit particular environmental circumstances (e.g., Garcia et al., 1985; Griffin, 1991; Marler, 1993; Shettleworth, 1993; Bekoff & Jamieson, 1996 : Cummins-Dellarosa, 1996 Whiten, 1998; Bard & Russell, 1999; Corballis & Lea, 1999) . However, more generalized cognitive abilities are relatively rare among nonhuman animals (Reader & Laland, 2003; Hurley & Nudds, 2006; Wasserman & Zentall, 2006) , despite the obvious evolutionary advantages of such forms of intelligence. Generalized cognitive abilities provide the basis for flexible thinking, an ability that facilitates an individual's ability to adapt to novel situations (Reader & Laland, 2003; Proust, 2006 : Kuczaj & Makecha, 2008 . Thus, even though cognitive specificity may have resulted in evolutionary advantages for certain species, generalized forms of intelligence may also have provided important evolutionary advantages to other species. For example, the generalized human ability to plan across a wide variety of domains, especially in novel situations, likely accounts for much of our success as a species. In fact, one of the hallmarks of human intelligence involves the extent to which we are able to plan our behavior. This is not to say that humans are perfect (cognitively or otherwise). We are sometimes slow to learn from our mistakes, one example being our propensity to reelect incompetent and/or corrupt officials. Even when we do successfully solve a problem, the solutions oftentimes result from trial and error learning rather than some form of planning. But we can sometimes generate correct novel solutions to novel problems without trial and error, a remarkable mental capacity that involves aspects of both insight and planning. In order to engage in planning of this sort, it is necessary to represent the nature of the problem, the desired outcome, and possible behavioral schemes that will achieve the desired outcome (Tolman, 1932; Washburn, 1936; Procyk & Joseph, 1996 : Hauser, Kralik & Botto-Mahan, 1999 Sloman, 2005; Gopnik & Schulz, 2007) . In some cases, we might even imagine possible and/or hypothetical situations, even though we have never actually experienced the imagined scenarios. However, the ability to imagine possible outcomes is not sufficient to result in successful problem solving. Successful planning also requires an understanding of the causal relations that are pertinent to the problem at hand (Holyoak, 1995; Sloman, 2005; Gopnik & Schulz, 2007) . Otherwise, we might flounder about trying various solutions without any understanding of why certain things work and other things fail. In essence, then, planning is the ability to represent and use causal knowledge to create solutions (novel or familiar) that are appropriate for achieving a specific goal in a particular problem environment.
Observations of cetacean's spontaneous behavior suggest that dolphins and killer whales may engage in planning (Kuczaj & Walker, 2006) . For example, male dolphins sometimes cooperate to separate female dolphins from a female group in order for at least one of the males to mate with the isolated female, a mating strategy that appears to involve both cooperation and planning on the part of the participating male dolphins (Connor, Smolker & Richards, 1992; Connor & Krützen, 2003) . Dolphins and whales also use a variety of foraging strategies that seem to involve planning. These include the herding of fish into balls while individual animals take turns feeding (Similä & Fugarte, 1993) , the intentional stranding of dolphins to catch fish they have chased onto a bank (Hoese, 1971; DuffyEchevarria, Connor & Aubin, 2008) , the intentional stranding of killer whales to capture sea lion pups (Guinet & Bouvier, 1995) , the use of air bubbles to confuse, encircle, and trap prey (Fertl & Wilson, 1997) , and dolphins' placement of sponges onto their rostrums prior to searching the ocean floor for prey, most likely to prevent injury to their rostrums (Smolker et al. 1997) . Killer whales cooperate to dislodge seals and penguins from ice floes (Visser et al., 2008) , and also cooperate to force large schools of herring to the surface, which makes it easier for the whales to consume the fish (Nottestad, Ferno & Axelsen, 2002) . Dolphins also cooperate with humans to increase the foraging success of both species. Dolphins in South America cooperate with human fisherman to catch fish, a collaboration that has been carried on across generations (Pryor et al., 1990) . Cooperation between human fisherman and Irrawaddy dolphins has also been observed in Myanmar (Onishi, 2008) . Killer whales use bits of fish to lure sea gulls within catching distance, after which the gulls are used as play objects (Kuczaj et al., 1997 : Kuczaj & Makecha, 2008 . The whales' behaviors during these gull-baiting bouts appear to involve planning but also reflect trial and error learning on the part of some individual whales as they perfect their gull-baiting strategies. The combination of rapid learning on the part of some whales and the laborious trail and error learning of others suggests that the mechanisms involved in the cultural transmission of some behaviors in a population varies from animal to animal. Some animals observe another whale catching and playing with a sea gull, and learn to do so themselves via trial and error learning. Other whales observe successful animals more carefully and use these observations to plan their attempts. As a result, the whales in the later group become successful gull catchers much sooner than do those that learn via trial and error. Each of the above examples could be viewed as planned behaviors. But are the dolphins and killer whales that engage in these behaviors actually planning their behavior to produce specific outcomes? Or are there simpler explanations? Even if we decide that planning has occurred in some or all of these examples, can animals that engage in planning within a specific domain such as herding females, strand feeding, or sponge foraging generalize their planning skills to other domains? Or is their planning specific to a particular domain? In order to decide whether dolphins can plan at least some of their behaviors, it is necessary to define planning. A first step towards a definition is to eliminate behaviors that are clearly not planning. For example, many animals, from insects to mammals, engage in behaviors that appear to be intelligent planned actions, but are instead instinctive (Tinbergen, 1951) . Such behaviors do not involve planning, but are instead simple reactions to environmental stimuli. Accidental discoveries of useful behaviors also occur, as does trial and error learning. In the cases of instincts, serendipitously learned behaviors, and trial and error learning, the animal need not mentally represent the solution to a problem before it acts. To us, the ability to represent both the problem and its possible solutions is the essence of planning. But given the inherent difficulty of determining if an animal can mentally represent aspects of its world, how is it possible to decide if an animal has planned its behavior? Before one can decide if an animal's spontaneous behavior reflects some form of planning, it is necessary to know the developmental history of the target behaviors. Otherwise, it is difficult to decide if the behaviors were the result of some instinctual process, serendipitously learning, trial and error learning, observational learning, or planning. It is oftentimes difficult to ascertain the developmental history of naturally occurring behaviors given the limited amounts of observations that characterize most field studies. However, in an experimental context, animals can be exposed to novel problems that the experimenter knows the animal has never before experienced, making it possible to document the complete history of the behaviors that emerge as the animals attempt to solve the problems. In the remainder of this paper, we will describe two problems that were presented to two male Atlantic bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops truncatus) named Bob and Toby. Both problems were designed so that the dolphins could more efficiently obtain a goal if they planned their behavior. Bob and Toby were both approximately 15 years of age at the start of the first test, and were housed in a large aquarium at the Living Seas exhibit at EPCOT Center in Orlando, Florida. Both dolphins had prior experience in echolocation matching research (Xitco & Roitblat, 1996) and had also participated in a long-term study designed to discern how adept dolphins could become at learning to use symbols located on a large underwater keyboard to communicate with humans. One of the consequences of the dolphins' interactions with humans and the keyboard was the emergence of spontaneous pointing by the dolphins (Xitco, Gory & Kuczaj, 2001 ). The dolphins pointed at objects when they wanted humans to do something with the objects. The dolphins appeared to take the human's perspective into account when they pointed (Xitco, Gory & Kuczaj, 2004) , but it was impossible to determine from the dolphin's spontaneous behaviors if their pointing was planful in the sense in which we use the word in this paper. The following tests were designed as more direct methods to assess dolphins' planning ability.
Multiple Weight Test
The Multiple Weight Test required the dolphins to use weighted cylinders of PVC pipe, each of which was connected to a ring that made it easier for the dolphins to transport the weighted cylinders from one location to another. In this task, the dolphins needed to drop four of the weights into an apparatus in order to release a fish that they could then eat. The apparatus consisted of a 30 cm square by 1 m long vertical square tube that was constructed of clear lexan. A buoyant transparent box that could slide up and down was located inside this tube. The buoyancy of the box caused it to rise in the tube until stopped by a bar of plastic. One compartment in the box was used to hold fish for the dolphins. The fish was held in place by the side of the tube when the cube was in the up position. When sufficient weight was deposited on the top of the cube, it would slide down, resulting in the fish falling from a slot in the side of the tube. As mentioned above, in this test, four weights were required to depress the tube to the location where the fish would be released to the dolphin. This apparatus is schematically represented in Figure 1 . Bob and Toby each independently learned to operate the multiple-weight apparatus by observing individual human divers using SCUBA gear. Each dolphin was provided independent observational opportunities. These opportunities began when the dolphin approached the diver. While the dolphin was attending to the diver, the diver both looked at and pointed at the food compartment of the apparatus. Once the dolphin noticed the fish, the diver picked up one of the weights and dropped it into the apparatus. When the fish was not released, the diver gathered another weight and then dropped this weight into the apparatus. The process of dropping one weight at a time into the apparatus continued until the diver had deposited four weights into the apparatus, which released the food for the dolphin to consume.
For each observational opportunity provided a dolphin, eight weights were placed around the apparatus located on the bottom of the 8 m deep main aquarium in which the dolphins lived (see Figure 2) . The four weights used for each demonstration were randomly selected from the eight available weights. It is important to emphasize that even though the divers demonstrated how to operate the multiple-weight apparatus, the human models always used only one weight at a time. Thus, the dolphins never observed a model carrying more than one weight at a time (nor had prior experience doing so themselves). If the dolphins' behavior in this context reflected only mimicry of the humans' behavior, the dolphins should have continued to use only one weight at a time. On the other hand, if the dolphins were capable of planning their behavior in this context, they might have realized that it is more efficient to gather and deposit multiple weights on each trip to the apparatus despite never having seen multiple weights being used nor having used multiple weights themselves. Of course, the most efficient strategy in this case would be to gather and deposit four weights in one trip. Test trials were started once the dolphins began to drop weights into the multipleweight apparatus on their own, which required three demonstration trials by humans for Toby and ten demonstration trials by humans for Bob. Each dolphin was tested individually while the other dolphin was located in another part of the aquarium and unable to observe the dolphin being tested. Each dolphin was given a total of 50 trials (10 5-trial blocks) with the multipleweight apparatus. As shown in Figure 3 (the NEAR condition), the results are simple to summarize. The dolphins continued to use a one-weight-at-a-time approach to operate the apparatus throughout the 50 trials. At this point, we speculated that the dolphins were not sufficiently motivated to create a more efficient method of using the weights because all of the weights were too near to the apparatus (see Figure 2) , and so the relative ease of using one weight at a time may have contributed to the dolphins' failure to alter the strategy they had learned via observation. In the second phase of this test, the same configuration of weights were placed approximately 45 meters from the apparatus. At this distance, much more effort was required if the dolphins carried only one weight at a time to deposit in the apparatus. The dolphins were given another 50 trials in this FAR condition (as was the case in the NEAR condition, the trials were administered in 10 5-trial blocks). Once again, each dolphin was tested individually while the other dolphin was located elsewhere and unable to watch. As shown in Figure 3 , when the weights were placed in the FAR condition, both dolphins quickly altered their strategy of using a single weight at a time. Toby averaged 1.91 weights per trip for the first ten trials. The average number of weights he carried per trip rose to 3 during the fourth block of ten trials, but after this he returned to his two weights per trip strategy (perhaps because carrying three weights to the apparatus still required one more trip to obtain the crucial fourth weight). In contrast, Bob steadily increased the number of weights he carried per trip until at the end of the test he was carrying four or five weights per trip to the apparatus, meaning he had to make only one trip per trial.
Recall that the dolphins were tested individually and had no opportunities to observe one another's behavior in the Multiple Weight Test. The fact that both dolphins independently used a one weight at a time strategy when the weights were near the apparatus but independently adopted a multiple weight at a time strategy when the weights were far from the apparatus suggests that the dolphins were each capable of planning a novel behavior. The dolphins created the novel and appropriate behavior of using multiple weights to more efficiently operate the multiple weight apparatus and thereby more easily obtain the goal when the distance between the apparatus and the weights made it more beneficial to do so. Several points are worth noting. First, the behavior of carrying multiple weights and depositing them into the apparatus is not like any natural dolphin behavior. Although a few wild dolphins have been found to gather and use sponges as tools (Smolker et al., 1997) , the dolphins only use one sponge at a time and do not drop the sponges on their prey. Instead, they appear to use the sponges to protect their rostrums while they scour the ocean bottom in search of prey. Nor was this behavior like any other in Bob and Toby's repertoire. They had never seen a human or other dolphin use more than one weight at a time, and prior to the FAR test condition, neither dolphin had ever used more than one weight at a time. Second, it is not likely that the emergence of multiple weight carrying was simply a random variation in the dolphins' use of weights. The dolphins never used multiple weights in the NEAR condition, but quickly began to do so when the weights were moved further away. Finally, the dolphins could achieve the goal every trial by using one weight at a time, and did not need to modify their behavior in order to obtain the fish. The fact that they did so suggests that they understood the causal relations inherent in the task (i.e., multiple weights were required to release the fish), as well as the relative difference in effort required between using one weight at a time versus multiple weights at a time. The dolphins, then, appeared to have created the new behavior of using multiple weights at a time. In other words, they had developed a simple plan. Their behavior across the fifty test trials in the FAR condition also displays monitoring, an important feature of the planning process in humans (Friedman & Scholnick, 1997) . When a plan is devised and then implemented, the planner monitors the effectiveness of the plan in terms of its potential for success, and modifies the plan accordingly. In the present study, the dolphins successively varied the number of weights used per trip to the apparatus in the FAR condition. This was especially evident for Bob, who modified his plan so that he only needed to make one trip per test trial.
Retaining Weight Box Test
In order to examine the flexibility with which the dolphins engaged in planning, the dolphins were exposed to a new task in which successful planning would enable them to maximize their reward. The Retaining Weight Box Test involved a weight and three lexan boxes, each of which contained a fish. Each box was mounted on a stand such that the bottom of the box was approximately one meter from the floor of the aquarium. Each of these boxes required the use of a single weight to trip a mechanism that released the fish for the dolphin (see Figure 4) . Two of the boxes had open bottoms, so that when a dolphin dropped the weight into the box and tripped the food releasing mechanism, the weight then fell through the open bottom to the floor beneath the box. This enabled the dolphin to retrieve the weight and use it to obtain the fish from another box. However, the third box had a vertical tube that extended to the floor of the aquarium. Dropping the weight in this retaining box, which was clearly marked to indicate its difference from the other two boxes, resulted in the weight being contained within the extended compartment, preventing further use of the weight. We wondered how quickly the dolphins would learn to use the retaining box last in order to maximize the amount of fish they could obtain with a single weight. Because the dolphins had used weights before with a similar apparatus in the Multiple Weights Test, each dolphin was simply exposed to the new boxes in the Retaining Weight Box Test without any additional training. The dolphin, Bob, was tested first. Initially, the three boxes were positioned as the vertices of an 8-meter equilateral triangle with the single weight tool positioned at the center of the triangle. Within each of the first two 30-trial blocks, the retaining box was positioned equally often at each vertex in a randomly determined order. If the dolphin operated the retaining box last, it would obtain all of the available food. If not, the dolphin would receive only one or two loads of food, depending upon whether it used the retaining box on the first or second attempt. If a dolphin was incapable of planning the order in which it utilized the boxes, then it should have used the retaining box equally often as the first, second, and third site visited across trials. Alternatively, if the dolphin could plan the order in which it used the boxes, then it should have used the retaining box more often as the last site. The results for Bob are shown in Figure 5 , which plots the proportion of trials in which Bob used the retaining site first, second, or third across six 30-trial blocks. During the first two blocks, Bob used the retaining box equally often as the first, second, or third site into which he dropped the weight. However, we suspected that this outcome might have been due to the placement of the boxes relative to the weight.
Bob was released for each trail from a gate that was approximately 8 meters above and 8 meters away from the equilateral triangle. When Bob was released for a trial, he swooped down and retrieved the weight while still moving. His forward momentum after grabbing the weight resulted in his close proximity to one of the boxes by the time he had swam to the height necessary to deposit the weight. Bob tended to drop the tool in this near box without inspecting any of the boxes. Thus, Bob's first choices seemed to be the result of an experimental artifact. As a result, we changed the positioning of the boxes and weights for Bob's remaining four 30-trial blocks. In the new configuration, the three boxes were placed approximately 1.3 meters away from each other in an 8-meter radius arc. The weight was placed 8.5 meters away from the boxes at the origin of the arc. In this configuration, when a dolphin picked up a weight while swimming, he could still observe and compare all of the boxes while swimming toward them without the artifact of his directional momentum biasing his first choice. Bob's last four 30-trial blocks and all of Toby's blocks were conducted using the new configuration. As shown in Figure 5 , Bob immediately began to use the retaining box almost exclusively last once this new configuration was implemented. Figure 6 shows that from the very first block onward, Toby most often used the retaining box last.
With the momentum artifact removed, both dolphins very quickly began to appropriately organize their use of the boxes to maximize the amount of fish they could obtain with the single available weight. As was the case with the Multiple Weight Test, this ordering behavior and this context are not like any natural dolphin behaviors, nor are they like any previously learned or observed behaviors by these dolphins. It is important to note that the dolphins were equally rewarded for using any of the boxes, including the retaining box, given that each box always contained equal amounts of fish. The rapid onset of their novel and appropriate ordering of their use of the boxes suggests that they understood the causal relations involved with the retaining box and its role in obtaining different amounts of fish on a given trial.
Conclusions
Planning is most evident in the ability to create novel behaviors that result in the successful solutions of novel problems. Such novel solutions should appear rapidly and completely, rather than through the gradual "slow" learning that would occur if the successful solution was discovered through trial and error learning or some accidental variation in behavior. The creation of these sudden and complete solutions to problems has often been characterized as "insight". Insight involves the sudden emergence of appropriate behavioral solutions to novel problems, and requires a capacity for causal reasoning (Frye et al., 1996) . There has been considerable debate about the nature of insight in humans (Sternberg & Davidson, 1995; Davidson & Sternberg, 2003) , and the same is true for animals (Reader & Laland, 2003) . Species ranging from birds to chimpanzees have been reported to produce "insightful" behavior (Köhler, 1925; Pitocchelli, 1985; Heinrich, 1999) , but such interpretations remain controversial (Reader & Laland, 2003; Hauser, 2003; Povinelli, 2000) . Throughout its lifespan, an animal develops an understanding of the causal structure of systems within its environment. Causal representations may involve natural systems (e.g., the mechanics of physical objects) or conventional systems (e.g., the dynamics of social systems). At one level, causal representations may consist of sets of unrelated associations between contexts, stimuli, behaviors, and outcomes. At the other extreme, causal representations may involve complex networks of interrelated tendencies exhibited by the activities of objects within the domain of concern. At this latter level, representations are sufficiently complex to enable an individual to project (a) how objects within the system may behave in novel situations, and (b) the results of hypothetical novel actions. For example, an animal might develop a naṏve understanding of physical principles (e.g., gravity, mass, momentum) that it can subsequently use to solve problems that involve novel objects and/or situations.
The dolphins' behavior in the two tasks described above suggests planning abilities, albeit limited ones, based on their apprehension and appreciation of the causal relations between their actions and the outcomes they achieved. The dolphins' performance in the Multiple Weight Test demonstrated that each of the dolphins could plan his behavior in order to more efficiently achieve a goal. Impressively, each of the dolphin's plans involved the creation of a new behavior  carrying more than one weight at a time.
Neither dolphin, regardless of whether the model was a human or a dolphin, had ever observed this behavior. Nor had either dolphin performed such a behavior previously. The fact that each dolphin arrived at this solution independently suggests that the dolphins were able to represent the inherent nature of the task and derive more efficient behaviors for the problem at hand. The fact that Toby elected to make two trips as his most efficient strategy and that Bob opted to carry more weights and make only one trip per trial illustrates individual differences in dolphin planning, but does not take away from the fact that each dolphin produced behaviors consistent with the notion that they had planned behaviors in the Multiple Weight Test when it was beneficial for them to do so (i.e., when the weights were sufficiently far away).
In the Retaining Weight Box Test, the dolphins were able to follow a simple plan to use the retaining box last in order to optimize the number of fish they would receive per trial. Once again, each dolphin arrived at this solution independently, which suggests that the ability to engage in such planning may be common among dolphins. It is also worth noting that the dolphins always received their daily allotment of food regardless of how they performed on the tasks. Moreover, the dolphins received food throughout the day, and so were not tested only when they were hungry. For these reasons, we do not think that the dolphins' behaviors can be explained simply in terms of correct responses resulting in the primary reinforcement of fish for the dolphins to consume. Both dolphins seemed to enjoy solving problems that humans provided (at least on most days), and the fish they received for correct responses in the task described in this paper functioned more as indicators that the dolphins had arrived at a correct solution than as primary reinforcement per se (see Kuczaj & Xitco, 2002 , for a more detailed consideration of this idea). Moreover, each dolphin could obtain its fish in the Multiple Weight Test by dropping a single weight at a time, and so did not need to adopt another more efficient strategy. Similarly, in the Retaining Weight Box Test, the dolphin received fish no matter what box it chose  the difference being the ability to continue if the retaining box was used last.
As noted earlier in this paper, the most convincing evidence of planning is the ability to create novel and appropriate behaviors to deal with novel situations. The two dolphins demonstrated such ability in the tasks described in this paper, implying an ability to engage in causal reasoning about novel future-directed behavior. The planning skills demonstrated by these dolphins suggest that such ability does not require human language-like skills. It is possible that the powerful cognitive ability of planning emerged in human ancestors prior to language, and perhaps even facilitated the emergence of language abilities (see Oller & Griebel, 2008 , for recent discussions of the evolution of language). Consistent with this possibility, referential symbol use (i.e., the use of symbols to direct the attention or thoughts of another) requires an ability to plan (i.e., an intention to direct the attention or thoughts of another). Although language is frequently identified as the means that enabled humans to outpace other animals cognitively (Gibson & Ingold, 1993; Pinker, 1994; Bickerton, 1995; Deacon, 1997; Corballis & Lea, 1999) , a flexible generalized planning ability can also provide significant advantages to a species (Bradshaw, 1993) . For example, the ability to plan allows individuals to do more that simply react to their environment. Planning one's behaviors allows an organism to conserve energy by limiting behaviors to those that are the most efficient and likely to succeed. Planning also can enable animals to avoid costly, perhaps even lethal, mistakes, as well as to deal with sudden environmental aberrations for which evolution has not otherwise prepared the species. While such flexible and generalized planning abilities may have been enhanced by language in humans, it is not clear that language was necessary for their development. The fact that the dolphins created novel appropriate behaviors within domains so unlike any natural dolphin behavior suggests a fairly generalized ability to plan, rather than one restricted to domains that are particularly relevant to the niche occupied by dolphins. This demonstrates that in addition to studying how the cognitive abilities of species are formed by ethological factors across evolution to create specific niche dependent abilities, it is also useful to search for generalized cognitive abilities that engender flexibility within species to deal with ecological challenges (Kuczaj & Walker, 2006; Kuczaj & Makecha, 2008) . For example, the ability to represent, reflect upon, and reorganize action sequences into appropriate novel behaviors is one of the hallmarks of successful human problem-solvers. Although the results presented in this paper demonstrate that dolphins can plan their behavior in novel contexts, the extent to which dolphins can restructure their behavior to solve novel problems is unknown. Future work should focus on discovering the boundaries of dolphin planning abilities, knowledge that will help to delineate the similarities and differences between dolphin problem solving and that of other species (Kuczaj & Walker, 2006) . But in addition to comparisons across species, it is important to make comparisons of individuals within a species (Tolman, 1932; Kuczaj & Walker, 2006; Highfill & Kuczaj, 2007) . For the answers to the question "how intelligent are dolphins?" must always begin with two other questions: "Compared to what?" and "Which dolphin to you mean?"
